Freeing the Strait of Hormuz: the plan of the seven. Navigating between diplomacy, armed escorts, and the (very high) cost of indecision.

Just beyond the Strait of Hormuz, dozens of hulls can be counted: some facing east, others stationary for days. The crews are waiting for someone to make a decision for them. On one side, Iranian warnings: "Transit prohibited, until further notice." On the other, the pressure from Washington: "Tankers must pass, we will escort them." In between, Europe and Asian allies grappling with the draft of a document – seven flags at the bottom – proposing to "free" the strait and restore freedom of navigation, with a dedicated naval mission and, if necessary, the use of force. This is the plan that London has put on the table in the last 48 hours, and which Brussels is weighing with surgical care.

What’s in the “seven” document

According to leaks and cross-confirmations, the initiative – discussed in Brussels and vigorously promoted by the British government – has garnered political support from at least seven countries: the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Canada, and Japan. The explicit goal is to ensure the safe passage of commercial traffic, particularly tankers, through the Strait of Hormuz, which is currently effectively paralyzed. The draft provides for a "mission" – initially for deterrence and escort – and leaves open the possibility of limited and proportionate military action to remove immediate threats to navigation. In parallel, the text emphasizes the need for an "immediate ceasefire" in the Iranian theater, a condition that Paris considers essential to avoid escalating the conflict.

It’s a precarious balance: London is pushing for a clearer statement and a coalition of "willing participants"; Berlin and Rome insist on legal bases and international mandates; Tokyo is carefully assessing the risks to its energy routes. The common denominator, so far, is a political declaration of support for the reopening of Hormuz and freedom of navigation, without automatic commitments of troops or resources. Six allies, in fact, have already held back on any notion of "following Trump into war."

The White House's push: "Help us keep the strait open"

The request came directly from President Donald Trump: to involve "about seven countries" to deploy warships to protect energy routes and "force" the reopening of Hormuz. So far, however, the solicitations have not translated into concrete commitments. Washington has announced that the US Navy will be able to escort tankers, and the DFC will offer insurance coverage against political risk for cargoes in transit in the Persian Gulf. But the reality of the sea is harsher than proclamations: without a reduction in risk, shipowners and insurers do not move.

In talks in Brussels, European leaders have called for the immediate reopening of the strait and a freeze on attacks on energy and water infrastructure in the region. The EU is exploring "ways to ensure freedom of navigation," while G7 partners discuss whether and how to contribute to a "strictly defensive" multinational escort compatible with maritime law.

Why the Strait of Hormuz is a global "bottleneck"

The Strait of Hormuz is the valve through which about 20% of the world's oil flows on average and a similar share of LNG: in 2024, an average of around 20 million barrels per day transited, with peaks representing over a quarter of the crude transported by sea. A prolonged disruption affects not only the flows of crude and LNG, but also those of chemicals, fertilizers, and methanol, impacting manufacturing supply chains from Asia to Europe. It is not surprising that, with the effective closure of the passage, the price of a barrel surged above 100 dollars in the second week of March 2026.

The issue is not just quantity. The geographical dependence is extreme: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Emirates, and Iran channel their exports almost entirely through Hormuz. The bypass alternatives – the Saudi Petroline pipeline to the Red Sea and the Emirati ADCOP pipeline to Fujairah – can only absorb a fraction of global demand. The rest remains "trapped" in the Gulf.

The legacy of AGENOR and historical precedents

If there is already a ready-made European model, it is EMASoH/AGENOR, the French-led mission launched in 2020 to "reassure" civilian traffic in the Gulf, Arabian Sea, and in the Strait of Hormuz. Italy, Germany, The Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Greece, and Portugal have over time shared arrangements or staff, maintaining a strictly defensive and non-provocative profile. Integrating or "reactivating" that framework – perhaps expanding it and coordinating it with the EU mission in the Red Sea – is one of the technical hypotheses on the table.

However, historical precedents invite caution. In 1987-88, the American Operation Earnest Will escorted “reflagged” tankers under stars and stripes. It was a partial success: traffic resumed, but amid mines, missiles, and tragic mistakes – the downing of Iran Air 655 – the political cost was extremely high. Today, in an even more "digitalized" strait, where drones and anti-ship missiles saturate the tactical horizon, an armed escort requires rules of engagement, interoperability, and above all, an exit strategy.

The Italian and European Position

On March 20, 2026, while discussions on energy and security take place in Brussels, Rome reiterates a fundamental line: freedom of navigation to be protected, yes; but within a clear and shared legal framework, prioritizing de-escalation. Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani has emphasized on several occasions the importance of protecting Hormuz and the Red Sea, signaling Italy's willingness for coordinated European solutions, avoiding solitary adventures. In the EU–GCC Council on March 5, ministers jointly reaffirmed the urgency of safeguarding maritime routes and the security of supply chains.

On the European front, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has ruled out being “dragged into a wider war,” yet is calling for a “legal and well-crafted” plan for navigation security. France under Emmanuel Macron is pushing for a “purely defensive” coalition bound to a truce; Germany and Italy share the cautious approach. Japan, in turn, conditions every step on international law and the protection of its seafarers.

How much does it really cost to keep Hormuz closed

In addition to the price of crude oil, there are insurance premiums, freight rates, and additional sailing days when passing through the Cape of Good Hope. Just one week of "de facto" blockage can trigger price increases throughout the entire logistics chain: from fertilizers to methanol, to petrochemical products. According to EIA and IEA analyses, a share between "one-fifth and one-third" of some global energy and chemical raw materials has Hormuz as a pressure valve. For Europe, the combined effect on inflation and bills is immediate; for Asia, the knot is supply security: China, India, Japan, and South Korea together absorb well over half of the crude oil flows that pass through the strait.

The figures also say a lot about structural vulnerability: even with maximum activation of Saudi and Emirati pipelines, there would still be a "gap" of several million barrels per day. And the LNG from Qatar – over 20% of global flows – does not have an equivalent bypass: without Hormuz, it stops.

What does it mean to "free" the strait: three options, a crossroads

Option 1: "De-escalation plus deterrence." A visible but non-intrusive multinational mission, coordinated with EMASoH/AGENOR, that monitors and accompanies civilian transits, without kinetic operations except for self-defense. It requires a simultaneous reduction of hostilities in Iran and a commitment from Tehran to cease attacks on ships and infrastructure. Pro: immediately lowers risk premiums. Con: vulnerable to "spoilers" and incidents.

Option 2: "Armed escort for corridors." Planned convoys, clear rules of engagement, active neutralization of threats near the corridors. It is the model "Earnest Will 2.0": it works if the coalition is broad, interoperable, and protected by a robust legal mandate. Pro: strong reassuring effect; Con: risk of escalation and errors with high political costs.

Option 3: "Force the blockade." Preventive actions against launch platforms, drones, depots, and naval assets in sensitive areas. It is the hypothesis closest to what has been advocated by the White House during the tensest hours. Pro: maximum deterrence in the very short term. Con: extremely high risk of open war and asymmetric retaliation on a regional scale.

The firm points that the "seven" will have to resolve

Legal framework. Without a clear reference to UNCLOS, UN, or – for Europeans – to shared security policy instruments, any escort risks turning into a "national adventure." The request that Italy, Germany, and France converge on is: a defensive operation, time-limited, proportionate, with mechanisms for deconfliction and transparent accountability.

Command and interoperability. AGENOR provides an operational framework: headquarters, procedures, experience in the scenario. However, the integration of non-European assets (from Japan to Canada) implies a joint command and accurate intelligence sharing.

Political objectives. "Liberating" the strait for a few weeks is not enough if the conflict remains active on land. For this reason, Paris is calling for an immediate ceasefire as a precondition for the naval operation. Brussels is working on a dual track: maritime security and diplomatic pressure on Tehran to cease cross-border attacks.

Economy and insurance. The mission is worthwhile if it convinces shipowners and insurers to return to the route. Financial guarantees and a public backstop for the “war/strike” risk are needed at least on the escorted corridors, as already proposed by the USA via DFC.

What happens now

In the next 72 hours, the “seven” will translate the draft into a politically usable text in the EU and G7 meetings. A group photo will not be enough: ships, rules, money, and, above all, a shared narrative that explains to the public why defending Hormuz does not mean “going to war,” but protecting the nervous system of the global economy. In the meantime, at sea, some tankers linked to Iranian or Russian operators continue to attempt passage; others remain anchored, waiting for a credible green light. The risk is that indecision prolongs the emergency and multiplies costs, without bringing closer to peace.

If Europe – and the partners of the G7 – really want to “liberate” the strait, they will have to do so with the same discipline as planning a pilotage in narrow waters: updated maps, charted channel, controlled speed, clear signals. It is the difference between a safe passage and a collision with the rocks.