Hormuz, the route that holds the world's breath. The Six's plan (including Italy) and the Iranian threat: "You will be complicit"

The Strait of Hormuz - that narrow passage of just about fifty kilometers from which a crucial share of global energy supplies depends - has become a shadow zone: transit reduced to the bone, insurance skyrocketing, alternative routes that are insufficient. It is in this operational void (after days of blockage) that six countries - United Kingdom, Italy, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Japan - say they are ready to contribute to a coordinated plan to restore freedom of navigation, with a political objective even before a military one: to reopen the energy bottleneck without sliding into open war with Iran.

A “Six Plan” to Reopen Hormuz

Against the backdrop of U.S. pressures for a broader coalition, European capitals have chosen a distinct profile: no direct involvement in fighting, but diplomatic work and, if necessary, a naval escort device to protect commercial traffic. In London, Downing Street has announced that the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany are “working on a series of options to protect commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz,” while in Paris, President Emmanuel Macron has reiterated at the G7 the need to “restore freedom of navigation as soon as possible,” even making additional units available for “purely defensive” escort missions. From Berlin and Rome, converging signals have arrived: support for freedom of navigation, caution against uncontrolled escalation. The Hague has participated in the initial technical contacts; Tokyo observes with growing concern the risks of energy shock and evaluates contributions consistent with its pacifist constitution.

On the operational level, the hypotheses under study intertwine with the existing European framework. France has announced the deployment of additional Marine Nationale units and the intention to put two frigates in support of a European escort device through Operation Aspides — the naval framework of the EU in the Red Sea and the Gulf, adaptable to a post-escalation Hormuz scenario. The French naval group also includes naval assets from Spain and the Netherlands, a concrete indication of European convergence. Italy and Greece are among the key countries for command and logistical support of Aspides, a sign that the technical backbone of a potential mission to Hormuz is already largely in place.

Tehran Responds: “Those Who Help Washington Are Complicit”

As the diplomatic-military construction takes shape, Tehran raises the volume. Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi warned that countries that "assist the United States" in operations against Iran will be considered "accomplices." More generally, the Iranian establishment promises "severe responses" and warns of "no moderation" should targets such as energy infrastructure, oil facilities, or critical nodes for water and electricity be hit again. In recent weeks, Tehran has already reported attacks against sensitive energy sites — including the Qeshm area and the Kharg oil hub — and has linked its retaliation to the defense of assets considered strategic for the country's economic survival.

Concerns are not only Iranian. Amnesty International has called on all parties involved — Iran, Israel, USA, and regional actors — to cease "illegal" attacks against energy infrastructure: refineries, power plants, desalination facilities. Hitting them, the organization warns, risks causing irreversible environmental damage and humanitarian disasters in an already fragile area.

Hormuz, the bottleneck of the planet

Why all this display of attention? Because about one-fifth of the world's oil and a similar share of LNG transit through Hormuz, mostly directed towards Asian markets but also crucial for Europe. When the Strait is perceived as a "war zone," maritime trade shrinks, insurance rates rise, freight costs soar, and the price of oil barrels starts to climb again. Even with Saudi and Emirati pipelines partially bypassing the Strait, alternative capacity remains limited: it is not enough to compensate for a prolonged blockade. Indeed, after the attacks and threats in early March 2026, transits collapsed, and on some days only a few ships were counted in passage.

The energy photograph also explains European caution. In Brussels, EU leaders reiterated that "this is not our war," refusing to be drawn into a direct conflict while acknowledging that the security of maritime chokepoints — Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb — is a European strategic interest. Hence the idea of a "dual track": diplomatic pressure to cease hostilities and missile exchanges, accompanied by a defensive escort tool to protect supply lines.

Military Scenarios and Rules of Engagement

An eventual mission by the Six should avoid any perception of a "blockade" against Iran and maintain rules of engagement that are strictly defensive: identification, deterrence, escort, reaction only to immediate threats. The presence of European and Japanese units under a flag distinct from the USA is an integral part of the message: to ensure freedom of navigation as a global public good, not to participate in an offensive campaign. France has already expressed its willingness to allocate additional ships to escorts, incorporating them into the EU perimeter. Italy and Germany are working on technical packages (deployments, rotations, support bases). The Netherlands and Japan can contribute modern frigates, detection systems, and electronic warfare capabilities. However, everything will depend on the violence curve: if missiles and drones strike again near traffic channels, the margin for a "light" device will diminish.

The Message Coming from Tehran

For Tehran, Hormuz is a strategic and symbolic lever. The IRGC's ability to influence transit is part of Iran's negotiating arsenal since the '80s. But truly blocking the Strait means hitting Iranian interests as well: crude oil exports, currency revenues, internal stability. This is why threats alternate between apocalyptic tones and tactical calculation. In the recent attacks on Iran's energy infrastructure — from the Qeshm area to Kharg — Tehran's response has been lethal politically, more selective militarily: missiles and drones with an “Iranian signature,” but with the usual strategic ambiguity regarding the direct or mediated authorship of the strikes, and a continuous appeal to the right of self-defense enshrined by the UN. Meanwhile, Minister Araghchi has multiplied warnings: “all options on the table” and “no impunity” for those threatening oil and nuclear sites.

The human cost: Lebanon bleeds

While the foreign offices scrutinize nautical charts and guarantee tables, war strikes civilians. In Lebanon, where the clash between Israel and Hezbollah has reignited to levels not seen since 2006, the Ministry of Health has reported a toll exceeding 1,000 victims since the start of the latest wave of hostilities, with over one million displaced. It is a country at its breaking point, with Beirut and the south under repeated bombardments and essential services in fits and starts. The figures fluctuate depending on the days and sources, but the trend is clear: the curve of deaths and injuries rises, while that of medical supplies falls. For Europe, the risk is a new migratory shock and a humanitarian wound at its doorstep.

The market variable

The reflection is immediately seen in the energy markets: oil prices surge every time commercial satellites register a decrease in movements in the Strait; European gas reacts to alarms about Gulf infrastructure; the companies that insure maritime traffic recalibrate their premiums. With Hormuz under strain, any “incident” — a swarm of drones, an aggressive boarding, a miscalculation — can turn into a price shock. One more reason, European diplomats explain, to keep the dossiers separate: one thing is the protection of freedom of navigation, another is military operations against Iran. The former is a common good; the latter leads straight to the risk of regional escalation.

The legal node and the political perimeter

There is also a theme of international law. The freedom of navigation in the seas and international straits is a cornerstone principle of the Montego Bay Convention. However, Iran contests the Western interpretation of transit passage, invoking security and self-defense. The EU–GCC framework of March 5, 2026 has put in writing the shared commitment to "safeguard regional airspace, maritime routes, and freedom of navigation, including in the Strait of Hormuz and at Bab el-Mandeb." This is the minimum platform on which the Six's plan rests: to defend a principle of international order without granting Tehran the right to leverage it for geopolitical ends.

What can go wrong (and what can go right)

Three main uncertainties. The first is the dynamics of attacks on energy infrastructure. As long as oil, gas, and water remain targets—from refineries to desalination plants—the complete reopening of Hormuz will remain fragile. Even a single strike on pumping stations or terminals can halt a queue of ships stretching kilometers. Amnesty and other observers are calling for an immediate halt to these attacks, which in many circumstances violate the Conventions on the protection of civilians.

The second is the “complicity” evoked by Araghchi. If Tehran were to believe that European or Japanese ships are providing "cover" for hostile actions by the USA, the risk threshold would rise. Transparent rules of engagement and mission traceability will be crucial to avoid providing pretexts.

The third is the domestic politics in the involved capitals. European public opinions are reluctant to new military adventures. This has been seen in the messages from Berlin, Rome, and Madrid: "this is not our war," but the protection of routes and the lowering of tension are a priority. A complex balance that requires visible results: ships departing, insurance premiums dropping, supplies arriving at ports.

Italy: national interest and European posture

For Italy, which is part of the Six Plan, the stakes are twofold. On one hand, national interest: energy supplies, maritime exports, security of communication lines. On the other, credibility as a European actor capable of combining diplomacy and naval capability. Involvement in Aspides and the tradition of missions in the wider Mediterranean offer Rome a mature operational profile: multipurpose frigates, helicopters, protection teams for merchant vessels. But the political compass remains European: escort yes, war no; deterrence yes, escalation no.

Is a window for de-escalation still possible?

Is there room for a maritime truce? A technical ceasefire on critical routes and infrastructure — starting from Hormuz — would not resolve the broader conflict, but it would take oxygen out of the spiral. Mutual guarantees would be needed: shared monitoring of maritime spaces, direct channels between military navies, explicit commitments not to strike energy targets. European diplomacy — led by France — has explored this ground with the idea of an ad hoc coalition of “willing” dedicated solely to escorts and assistance to civilian traffic. But the necessary condition remains the reduction of fire on coasts and cities, starting from Lebanon, where every day adds victims and displaced persons to an already horrifying count.

The point

The Hormuz crisis is a test of global governance: if the world can defend a common good like freedom of navigation without plunging into total war, we will have gained a valuable precedent. The Six Plan does not promise miracles, but it opens a narrow path: separating the protection of trade flows from the logic of reciprocal retaliation. To succeed, transparency, solid rules of engagement, patient diplomacy, and a command chain capable of making quick decisions without emotional lapses will be needed. The rest will be told by the radars in the Gulf and the records of the harbormasters: when oil tankers begin to move again, we will know that politics has carved out some space from war.