Iran and revolution: who was Gholamreza Soleimani, the leader killed by Israel. The story and the role in the Basij.

The convoy travels at night on a provincial ring road. A few minutes later, the explosion. In the following hours, a claim comes from Tel Aviv: the Israeli Air Force has eliminated the head of the Basij, General Gholamreza Soleimani. It is March 17, 2026, and with the announcement from the IDF, the public arc of the man who has led the most extensive paramilitary organization in Iran for about six years comes to a close – perhaps – a man who has been at the forefront of the harshest crackdowns in the streets, from November 2019 to the wave of protests that erupted after the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022. Tehran does not confirm in the early hours. But to understand the weight of that man, one must go back: to 1979, to the very idea of "mobilization" that names the Basij, and then to the career of an officer who grew up amid war, apparatus, and repression, until he sat at the top of a force that combines ideology, security apparatus, and social control.

An essential biographical overview

Born according to reports between 1963 and 1965 – in several sections indicated as originally from Farsan, in the province of Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari – Gholamreza Soleimani joined the ranks of the Guardians of the Revolution at a young age during the Iran-Iraq war. Over time, he climbed the ranks in the provincial bodies of the IRGC: various accounts place him in command of the Saheb al-Zaman Corps in Esfahan, with specific higher training and qualifications in the organization's command courses. The official biography is sparse and often fragmented – as is customary for figures with operational roles – but one fact is certain: on July 2, 2019, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed him commander of the Basij Organization, replacing Gholamhossein Gheybparvar. This marks the beginning of the most exposed phase of his career.

In Washington, a few months later, his name also appears among the officials targeted by U.S. sanctions: the Department of the Treasury designates him as the head of the Basij within a package against the metals economy and "senior regime officials," pushing the officer directly into the crosshairs of international pressure. In 2020 and the following years, similar measures come from the United Kingdom, EU, and other countries, with motivations related to "serious human rights violations" and the role of the Basij in repressing protests.

What are the Basij and why do they matter

To understand the "power" of Soleimani, one must measure the apparatus he directed. The Basij were established by decree of Ruhollah Khomeini on November 25, 1979 as a "mobilization force" in service of the revolution: a network of volunteers, rooted in neighborhoods, mosques, schools, universities, and factories. Over time, the structure – formally subordinate to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – became institutionalized to the point of becoming a pillar of internal order management: from patrols to checkpoints, from moral control in public squares to ideological campaigns and social services that foster consent and recruitment. Estimates of their numbers vary: from the over 11 million claimed in the past in terms of nominal memberships to more cautious assessments – hundreds of thousands of trained activists, with peaks of mobilization reaching up to 500,000‑1,000,000 in case of emergency. Their role, academic research and policy centers note, has been crucial during the crackdowns of 2009, in 2019‑2020, and in 2022‑2023.

From an operational perspective, the Basij combines three levels: the dimension of "proximity," embodied by neighborhood cells and student units in universities; the "security" arm, integrated with police and IRGC for patrols, arrests, and dispersals; an ideological-organizational ecosystem that works on youth, associations, local media, and even "volunteer" initiatives, often highlighted by state media. This blend explains why the commander of the Basij becomes a crucial link between politics, security forces, and society.

The Soleimani era: six years at the top between public squares and repression

With the arrival of Soleimani at the helm, in July 2019, the Basij machine almost immediately enters its toughest test. In November 2019, following the shocking announcement of the tripling of fuel prices, a spontaneous protest spreads across dozens of cities. Reports from NGOs and the United Nations document the extensive use of lethal force by security apparatuses, including police, IRGC, and Basij. Estimates of casualties vary – with reports of over 300 deaths according to UN assessments and even higher figures in other accounts – but the script is clear: large-scale, fire against unarmed protesters, raids, trials. That November is a watershed moment in the recent Iranian collective memory and permanently affects the reputation of the Basij and their commander.

Months of low and high intensity follow: between January 2020 and 2021, windows of protest alternate with pandemic restrictions, propaganda campaigns, and youth recruitment. But it is in September 2022 – after the death of Mahsa Amini – that the network of the Basij is once again thrust into the spotlight. The mobilization “Women, Life, Freedom” spreads across 31 provinces, with hundreds of gatherings recorded in the first weeks. International observers and independent investigations describe a pattern already seen: mass arrests, use of live ammunition and metal pellets, shots fired at close range against unarmed protesters and bystanders. In the official narrative, the Basij appear as “victims” of a plot “orchestrated from abroad”; on the ground, their units act in support of the police and in coordination with the provincial units of the IRGC. The chain of command, with Soleimani at the top, is more decisive than ever.

Not surprisingly, when in 2026 the IDF announces that it has killed him in a raid in Iran, Israeli commanders explicitly link his name to the "leadership of major repression operations during the recent internal protests", echoing a profile that in the West had already been translated into sanctions lists, dossiers, and positions. Early agencies recall that Tehran does not immediately admit the loss, while biographical reconstructions emphasize how Soleimani has no relation to the more well-known Qassem Soleimani, head of the Quds Force killed by the USA in 2020, but shares with him the habitus of the IRGC officer raised in the idea of resistance and ideological discipline.

Sanctions, state narrative, and "total war"

On the international level, the figure of Gholamreza Soleimani becomes over the years a case study of the intersections between internal security and the political projection of the regime. The US Treasury targets him in January 2020, placing him on the SDN List as the head of the Basij; between 2020 and 2025, notes in the sanctions registers of London and Brussels indicate similar measures for his role in "serious human rights violations", with direct references to the crackdown of November 2019 and, later, to the protests of 2022-2023. In parallel, in public appearances, Soleimani embodies the rhetoric of "resistance" against the USA and Israel, describing the Basij as the "vanguard" not only militarily but also morally: from factories to markets, the "frontline fighters" become – in his words – producers and merchants, defending the wartime economy. It is the lexicon of a permanent mobilization.

In the background, publications from think tanks and research centers highlight another piece: since 2007, the Basij have been formally absorbed under the command of the head of the IRGC, consolidating their nature as an internal arm of the revolutionary body. This has increased their organizational power and political cover, but also their opacity: analysts struggle to accurately estimate personnel, bills, and the chain of command between the center and provinces. In this space, the actions of those like Soleimani unfold, transforming the Basij into a system capable of surveillance, punishment, but also providing services and propaganda: an architecture rather than a simple militia.

The blind spot of the biography

As often happens with IRGC officials, there remain shadow areas: the exact year of birth fluctuates between 1963 and 1965, few verifiable details about the early career, provincial passages reconstructed through clues from news reports. Here too, however, the lack of details is not an accident: the management of the public profile of officials responsible for internal security favors militant anecdotes and rhetoric over minute accounts. It is a feature of the regime of discretion that has accompanied the Basij since 1979: mobilizing millions as a founding myth, making tens of thousands act as a real tool.